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Jury deliberat ion: an observat ion study 
Gary Winship (2000)  Group Analysis,  33, 4:  547-557 
 
I n this art icle, the way that  the jury works is considered 
from  a group-analyt ic perspect ive. Observat ional fieldwork 
of sim ulated jury deliberat ions is presented. The data was 
gathered from  a joint  funded Hom e Office and Law 
Com m ission project  at  the Socio-Legal Studies Cent re, 
Oxford in 1995. I nferences are drawn from  the observat ions 
and the unconscious group processes are considered. The 
efficacy of the jury process is discussed.  
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I n studying the history of the jury, from  the adopt ion of dem ocrat ic t r ials in pre-
Solon Athens (c. 500 BC)  through to present -day jury system , the ascendancy. and 
the dem ise of the jury system  appears to be a concom itant  of dem ocrat ically 
ordered societ ies (Winship, 1997) .  That  is to say, the jury system  histor ically has 
em erged where there has been a shift  away from  despot ic and oligarchical 
governance to m ore dem ocrat ically inclined polit ies. The jury appears to be an 
em blem  of a m aturing public psyche where the responsibilit y for m aking st r ingent  
decisions is shared am ong the people, by the people and for the people as Aristot le 
( in Polit ics, 1905)  urged.  
The literature about  jury research m ainly encom passes 9utcom e paradigm s 
that  are of a behavioural, sociological and group psycho-  m et ric perspect ive (e.g. 
St rotbeck and Hook, 1961;  Mills and Kessler, 1973;  Zeisel and Diam ond, 1978;  
Baron et  al.,  1992) . There is a dearth of research into the em ot ionality of the jury 
process and, as far as I  can see, no psychoanalyt ic or group-analyt ic accounts. I n 
this paper I  carry forward a previous literature review  
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(Winship, 1997)  and present  som e prelim inary form ulat ions based on observat ions 
I  undertook of m ock jury deliberat ions. I t  is m y hope that  these findings m ay be 
the basis for future analyt ic enquiry and research into what  m ust  be a fecund area 
for group analysis in as m uch as social just ice is a feature of group therapy.   
A cent ral tenet  of m y brief exegesis here is that  the field of psychoanalysis 
and group analysis, vis-a-vis levels of unconscious pr im it ive process has m uch to 
offer in helping us understand the hitherto enigm at ic dynam ics of the jury process. 
I  say pr im it ive process because the jury is confronted with processing and 
arbit rat ing over the breakdown of social rest raint  where pr im it ive dr ives m ay be 
m anifest . From  a group-analyt ic perspect ive, the jury would appear to be a unique 
m ini- lab for analysis of such prim it ive process beyond the clinical set t ing.   
As a result  of the highly em ot ive issues that  the jury often has to process, it  
is not  surprising that  it  becom es a tangled web of int r igue and confusion in the 
public dom ain. I ndeed, the jury is not  just  a reservoir for the recesses of pr im it ive 
process, because from  beyond the court - room there is a weight  of public pressure 
and opinion which affects the jury. One only has to look at  the O.J. Sim pson t r ial, 
arguably the m ost  widely observed t r ial of this century, to get  a m easure of the 
com plex issues that  m ay im pinge upon the evidence that  the jury needs to process. 
The Sim pson t r ial is far  
from  except ional;  rather we m ight  see it  as an am plificat ion of the m yriad of 
personal, social and cultural tensions that  form  in the crucible of the jury. There are 
therefore tensions both from  within -  the dynam ics of the court room  and the case 
at  hand -  and also without  -  the pressure of public opinion that  perm eates what  we 
m ight  think of as the jury m at r ix.  
However, m any of these dynam ics have rem ained inaccessible to real- t im e 
research because the law im poses lim its on jurors talking about  their  experiences. 
Therefore m ost  of the research undertaken in the field is conducted in sim ulated 
set t ings and it  is from  such a research set t ing that  I  present  m y findings.  
 
Jury Deliberat ion -  A Fieldw ork Observat ion Study  
A research project  joint ly funded by the Hom e Office and the Law Com m ission, led 
by Sue Lloyd Bostock, was carr ied out  in the Socio-Legal Studies cent re in Oxford in 
1995. This was the first   
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large-scale jury research study in the UK since the 1970s. There were 24 m ock 
t r ials and I  carr ied out  a non-part icipant  observat ion procedure in four of the t r ials. 
Volunteers were recruited via local papers in Oxfordshire and were gathered into 
groups of twelve and invited along to the study cent re by let ter. Each sam ple group 
of jurors was asked to arr ive at  the sam e t im e. They were then ushered into a large 
room  with a television. A researcher from  the cent re int roduced the project  as:  'a 
study to see how jurors arr ive at  their  decision'. He then explained that  they were 
to see a m ock t r ial on video, with actors playing roles based on real cases, and that  
afterwards they would be asked to deliberate on the verdict . During proceedings 
the jurors were asked to com plete two quest ionnaires. The deliberat ions were 
audio- recorded.  
During m y observat ions I  carr ied out  an adapted version of Esther Bick's 
(1964)  unobt rusive psychoanalyt ic observat ion technique. This was a technique 
which I  had researched and developed for m y dissertat ion after a two-year infant  
observat ion course at  the Tavistock Clinic, London (Winship, 2000) . Regarding m y 
technique for the jury observat ion -  I  sat  outside the group in the com er of the 
room , about  2 m et res away from  the nearest  juror. I  was close enough that  I  was 
able to hear all the part icipants, but  not  so close that  m y range of view was lim ited. 
Scanning with m y eyes and m oving m y head slight ly, I  could see across the sam ple 
group. Had I  been sit t ing at  the table, inside the group so to speak, I  would have 
needed to m ove m y head considerably m ore to see around the group. I  considered 
the prevailing atm osphere, a com binat ion of noise, gestures and words which 
required visual and auditory observat ion. I  did not  keep notes during the 
observat ion but  within 15 m inutes afterwards recorded what  had happened, 
including som e of m y subject ive responses. I  at tem pted to keep an open m ind and 
not  to encode the data prem aturely, following Rust in's (1989)  recom m endat ions for 
undertaking observat ion study. I n watching the jury group I  did not  always follow 
the focal encounters but  stayed at tent ive to other events, the responses and 
resonances of  other jurors to the speaker. My field of study was as m uch about  the 
space as the people. I  did not  at tem pt  to object ify events, instead I  acknowledged 
m y observat ion as inext r icably linked to the network of social relat ions being 
studied -  that  is to say, observat ion via experient ial assim ilat ion or project ive 
ident ificat ion. I  will now present  one of the four observat ions.  
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Observat ion  
Fourth observat ion. The jury ( ten wom en, two m en)  was shown a video of a t r ial 
where the defendant  had pleaded not  guilty to stabbing Mr R. The defendant  
claim ed it  was self-defence. He said he had been working on his car and then had 
gone around to 'have it  out ' with the Mr R over a dispute. When Mr R cam e out  of 
his house he was allegedly brandishing a flick-knife. The defendant  said he 
happened to have a screwdriver in his pocket , so he defended him self.  
The video showed witness exam inat ions and cross-exam inat ions with all the 
key players. The final prosecut ion and defence cases were presented before the 
judge sum m ed up.   The video was engaging indeed;  the actors looked into the 
cam era so there was a feeling created of being drawn into the dram a. As I  
observed the jurors watching the video they looked m ost  absorbed, som et im es 
m aking notes. All appeared to be listening at tent ively and in silence. There was a 
palpable air  of som bre applicat ion to their  task of listening.  After the t r ial was 
finished the jury gathered around the table. The researcher cam e back into the 
room  and gave out  a quest ionnaire. The quest ionnaire asked each juror if they had 
m ade up their m ind or whether they were uncertain ( this was an anonym ous 
enquiry that  was repeated at  the end the deliberat ions) . After this the researcher 
collected the quest ionnaires and said:  'You have 45 m inutes to arr ive at  a decision, 
we norm ally require a 10: 2 verdict . Juries often elect  a foreperson.' He then left  the 
room . I  was sit t ing on the outside of the group and was int roduced as som eone 
who was there sim ply to observe proceedings and m onitor the audio  
recorder.  
I n the fourth observat ion at  first  there was a br ief silence of 15 seconds or so 
then som eone started pouring out  dr inks of squash from  a jug that  was in the 
m iddle of the table and asked people nearby if they wanted a glass. Several 
conversat ions began taking place sim ultaneously as the first   glasses of squash 
were drunk.  There was hubbub and excitem ent  within two m inutes. Then som eone 
said out  loud above the noise:  'Let 's see what  happens if we vote now', and 
proposed a show of hands. Seven voted 'not  guilty ' ( six fem ale and one m ale) , one 
(m ale)  was unsure and the rem aining four ( fem ales)  voted 'guilty '.  There followed a 
discussion about  the evidence presented by the barr isters about  the stabbing. 
Several m em bers dem onst rated with thrust ing m ot ions how the fight  m ight  have 
happened and the quest ion of self-defence  
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versus host ile at tack was the focus of the cogitat ions. As far as I  could note, the re-
enactm ent  of the stabbings, as the jurors im agined it ,  were at tem pts at  re- liv ing 
the fight . I n the m ain these were at tem pts to show that  the stabbing m ust  have 
been intent ional (because there were two stabbings)  and not  accidental or done in 
self-defence. These enactm ents led to a series of sub-discussions then a br ief 
silence. Som eone asked if anyone had changed his or  
her m ind. A Scandinavian wom an, who had voted 'not  guilty ',  said that  she believed 
that  the accused had done the stabbing but  there was not  enough evidence to find 
him  guilty. Another wom an asked;  'What  do the m en think? They are always 
working with tools. ' One of the m en said that  it  was Sunday afternoon so the 
defendant  had probably been drinking. There was a rather light -hearted discussion 
about  Sundays and m en and husbands, and at  this point  som e of the jurors 
divulged som e personal details about  how they spend their  Sundays.   
There were a few m ore interchanges followed by a considered and m ore 
serious dialogue for the next  15 m inutes or so, in which the jurors grappled with 
the act  of spontaneous violence versus m easured violence. Mem bers appeared to 
be t rying to think from  inside, t rying to put  them selves in the place of the players in 
the t r ial -  how they would or would not  act  spontaneously them selves given sim ilar 
situat ions. Words were chosen carefully, debate was m easured although there were 
m om ents of earnestness and at tem pts at  persuading others to a point  of view. The 
characters were analysed, for instance one wom an said:  'The accuser was sm ug, he 
sm iled all the way through his test im ony.' The defendant  was generally m ore 
esteem ed by everyone. During this t im e there was no talking over each other. Each 
juror spoke. There was another show of hands;  the only posit ion change was that  
the m ale who had been unsure now voted 'not  guilty ' (8 'not  guilty ',  4 'guilty ') .  A 
wom an com m ented that  it  was the younger people who were vot ing for a 'guilty ' 
verdict . This indeed was an astute observat ion and was followed by a fragm entat ion 
again as the discussion sub-grouped into three pair ings and two threesom es. This 
lasted for five m inutes unt il the researcher cam e into the room  on the m ark of 45 
m inutes. He asked if they had reached a decision and was told by several jurors 
that  they were st ill split .  The group filed out  of the room  and several of the group 
m em bers cont inued to converse with each other.  
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Observat ion Discussion  
I t  is a m ethodological issue as to how best  to process and draw inferences from  the 
above observat ional m aterial. Each of the four observat ions was unique, though a 
them at ical or dialogical analysis com paring all the observat ions m ay locate som e 
discernible pat terns com m on to each of the jur ies. However, the analysis of each 
one on its own m erits is the im plied start  point . I deally this m ight  be best  done in a 
group forum , with external and independent  witnesses to exam ine the data and 
then draw inferences, in m uch the sam e way that  Bick (1964)  recom m ends a 
collaborat ive effort  in processing m aterial from  infant  observat ions in a sem inar 
set t ing. I n the absence of collaborat ive data at  this stage I  will present  som e of m y 
own responses. (Here, the reader m ay wish to stop and m ake a note of their own 
responses to the data set  above before reading m ine below.)    
My overall feeling about  the observat ion is that  the discussions could not  be 
considered as not iceably logical. I n the above observat ion the jury did not  pom inate 
a ch~ erson and this m ight  be significant . However, the other three jur ies did 
nom inate Chairs and the discussions then seem ed no less random . The discussion 
of the jur ies, to m y m ind, had m ore of a quality of free associat ion. People seem ed 
to speak what  was com ing into their  m inds. The evidence, m ost ly, becam e 
incidental to the expressed opinions and feelings of the jurors about  the case. There 
was sense that  the jurors were filling in the gaps for them selves:  'I t  was Sunday, 
so he would ; , have been drinking.' I n this way the jury was const ruct ing a 
narrat ive of its own, a com m only noted m odus operandi, noted by Pennington 
(1981) . Likewise, Diam ond and Casper noted the speculat ive nature of the jury 
discussion when they concluded that  the group verdict  was a product  of 
preferences, expectat ions, inferences and stor ies that  individual jurors brought  to 
the deliberat ions. They concluded, however, that  'the algorithm s that  produce this 
t ransform at ion are not  well understood' (1992:  559) .  
I  suggest  that  the t ransform at ion of the story of the case of Mr R occurred as 
a result  of ident ificat ion whereby the discussion led into a dom ain which becam e 
increasingly personalized by one or m ore of the jurors. The em ot ional expression 
becam e m ore charged when the issues becam e personalized, that  is 10 say when 
the jurors put  them selves in the posit ion of the key protagonists, for instance in the 
re-enactm ents of the stabbing. This emot ionally charged ident ificat ion was 
part icular ly not iceable in Observat ion Two, when  
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the jury was deliberat ing over a case of sexual assault . At  such t im es, when the 
m aterial becam e subject  to ident ificat ion, the decibel level of the discussion would 
increase. There was a tendency within the group for one or m ore people to ident ify 
with either the defendant  or the plaint iff;  j urors would com m only use statem ents 
like;  'I f that  were m e' or 'I  would do such and such'. I n the fourth observat ion, the 
ident ificat ion with the case was  
clearly represented when several people were thrust ing im aginary knives into thin 
air  or at  each other. This seem ed to be a case of project ive ident ificat ion or 
m irror ing, whereby the dynam ics of the case cam e alive in the jury. I  had 
previously noted this process of ident ificat ion when I  exam ined the jurors' 
responses to the t r ial of John Hinkley, who shot  President  Reagan. Hinkley had 
developed a fixat ion for the young film -star Jodie Foster and in shoot ing Reagan he 
was m im icking the character Robert  De Niro played in the film  Taxi Drivel:  I n the 
t r ial the jury was shown the film , heard psychiat r ic test im onials and heard the 
bizarre let ters that  Hinkley had sent  to Jodie Foster. Juror Nathelea Brown reported 
afterwards ( in the US there are less st r ingent  laws about  jurors talking about  their  
experiences)  that  she herself had felt  m ad during the t r ial;  ' I  felt  I  was on the br ink 
of insanity going through all this, you know' (cited in Hans and Vidm ar, 1986:  183) .  
The group-analyt ic tem plate for this process of ident ificat ion, . .  whereby the 
juror and the jury-as-a-whole becom e a re-enactm ent  of the internal world of the 
accused, is exem plified in Klein's (1963)  except ional paper 'On the Oresteia'. 
According to Greek m yth, Orestes is brought  before the Athenian jury convened by 
Athene, charged with the m urder of his m other. After hearing the evidence the jury 
vote, but  are split  exact ly. Athene uses her cast ing vote to acquit  Orestes. The 
gorgon- like 'fur ies', who have tortured Orestes with psychot ic- like hallucinat ions 
since the m urder, are  
angered about  the decision. Athene offers the fur ies a hom e in her city and thus 
Orestes, though depressed, is relieved of their  taunt ing. Klein (1963)  interprets the 
m yth in term s of the st ruggle to integrate the self, the opposing votes showing that  
the self is not  easily united;  that  dest ruct ive im pulses are in opposit ion to the need 
for reparat ion and com passion. I n the t r ial scene Athene represents the good 
t r ium phant  m other in cont rast  to Clytemnest ra who represents the bad m urderous 
m other (she has killed Orestes' father, Agam em non) . The jury vote in the t r ial 
enacts the split  of Orestes'  
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internal objects, which are spilt  at  the paranoid schizoid level. The jury becom es a 
m irror of Orestes' internal dialogue.  
 
The Good Enough Jury?  
Project ive ident ificat ion m ay account  for the way the jury becom es m ore em broiled 
than it  ordinarily would in tense and em ot ive discussion. The jury is the recipient  of 
the polem ics of opinion in the court - room . I n silence, with no recourse to challenge 
or quest ion, the jury m at r ix becom es a reservoir which absorbs the m ult iplicity of 
project ions in the court room . The way that  the jury ident ifies with the case at  hand, 
becom ing absorbed in the dynam ics of the case, m ight  be not  only legit im ate but  
necessary. We m ight  we think of project ive ident ificat ion as m ediat ing 
understanding and  
com m unicat ion rather than im peding it .  I n this way, through a degree of em ot ional 
engagem ent , the jurors are able to exam ine the evidence with a depth that  goes 
beyond logic and rat ionality.  
However, the argum ents against  the capacity of the jury to process evidence 
logically by get t ing em ot ional entangled have rather led to the jury being under fire 
(Findlay and Duff, 1988) . There have been a num ber of high-profile t ravest ies of 
just ice, part icular ly so in cases where the jury has becom e a regressive and 
punit ive ancilla of public opinion. The t r ial of child defendants for the m urder Jam ie 
Bulger in the UK is a case in point .  Several m onths before the two accused boys 
were brought  for t r ial, the general behaviour of the public and the press was akin to 
that  of a lynch m ob. The accused were described as 'evil'  before any guilt  was 
proven. I t  would have been im possible for any juror to rem ain rem oved from  the 
m edia coverage and social influence in the case. There has recent ly been a call 
from  a European Com m ission for Hum an Rights for a re- t r ial, on the grounds that  
the first  t r ial was unfair . We have also seen the fallibilit y of the jury under the 
weight  of public opinion, with several recent  ret r ials such as the 'Birm ingham  Six' in 
the UK, and the m iscarr iage of just ice in the t r ial of Rodney King in Los Angeles. 
The racial prejudice apparent  in the jury verdict  of the Rodney King t r ial even 
prom pted the US President  at  the t im e and later a UK high court  judge to say they 
could not  see how the jury reached its verdict  (Crowther, 1992) . I nfluent ial figures 
such as Brian Clapham  (1991)  believe that  the jury ought  to be abandoned in 
favour of a system  where decisions are m ade by  
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judges who, he considers, are bet ter inform ed about  jur isprudence and are 
therefore m ore able to process legal data. He also cites the sheer expense to the 
public purse of the present  jury system . This m ay be a sound econom ic argum ent  
but  these at tacks represent  a rather worrying assault  on collect ivism  and faith in 
group dem ocracy.  
Foulkes's conceptualizat ion of the healthy wholeness of a group m ay form  a 
fundam ental argum ent  in favour of the jury system . The jury is gathered in a group 
because m any heads are bet ter than one where the st r ingency of decision-m aking 
is shared in a group that  is . sizeable enough to allow anonym ity where it  is st ill 
possible to m aintain a personal opinion against  a m ajority which is not  so 
num erically overwhelm ing ( reference, the film  Twelve Angry Men starr ing Henry 
Fonda) . The healthy wholeness of the group holds the group together as it  is faced 
with high levels of em ot ional engagem ent . Overall,  from  observat ions, I  felt  that  
there was som ething reassuring about  the capacit ies of the m ock jur ies to take on a 
difficult  task with a serious interest  in searching out  the t ruth. There were at tacks 
on thinking and flights into chaos, but  the jury showed that  it  could hold firm  to its 
task. Even where interest  dwindled and confusion reigned, the collaborat ive efforts 
reigned t rue. I  had a feeling that  I  was witnessing cit izenship cogitat ing  
towards its civilizing best .  
The current  argument  that  this task of deliberat ion should be ., assigned to 
individual m agist rates would be a denial of the necessity for social connectedness in 
establishing the m oral and social way of things. The com m andeering of people to 
the jury is perhaps a st rength of the process. Arguably, the reluctant  juror, pulled 
off the st reet  is the best  juror for this unsavoury job. The jury verdict  is 
t rem endously difficult .  I t  is an either/ or situat ion. The search for a verdict , then, 
arguably involves the jury operat ing at  a pr im it ive level of split t ing, an int rapsychic 
process, that  m ay be said to reenact  the early experience of different iat ion between 
the good and the bad. Juries re-enact  the split  in order to reach a decision about  
t ruth. I  suggest  that  the jury is a group re-enactm ent  of a pr im ary process as 
inclined to integrat ive behaviour as it  is to regressive behaviour, where paranoid 
schizoid split t ing is alm ost  funct ional in ident ifying t ruth and unt ruth.  
Theories aside, at  the end of the day it  m ay be a quest ion of faith;  does one 
subject ively believe the jury is good enough? Do we believe it  has the capacity to 
funct ion as a task group and not  exist  at  the level of a  
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basic assum pt ion group? When we quest ion the capacity of the jury we are, by 
im plicat ion, saying som ething about  society-as-whole. I  would draw the reader's 
at tent ion here to Alford's (1990)  debate about  a KleinianlBionian account  of groups 
where he takes a counter-posit ion to Rust in's (1990)  conceptualizat ion of the 
possibilit y of benign social const ruct ion. Rust in's (1990)  concept  of the innate 
hum an capacity for reparat ion and m orality is clearly resonant  with Foulkes's not ion 
about  the healthy wholeness of the group.  
I n defence of the jury, I  would argue that  it  is a concom itant  of a belief in 
dem ocrat ic just ice that  signifies a m aturing public psyche. However, if the jury 
system  is to be secured it  is necessary for it  to be seen as a less enigm at ic and 
m ysterious em blem  of just ice. I ts ownership needs to be held m ore resolutely in 
the public sphere. There is som e im pressive work carrying forward the idea of 
group dem ocracy in the shape of 'cit izens jur ies' (Stewart  et  al.,  1994) . 
Deconst ruct ing the jury and understanding how it  funct ions m ay be part  of de-
m yst ifying the jury and firm ing-up its crucial role in society. I  hope I  have thrown 
som e light  on som e of the m ysterious algorithm s of t ransform at ion in the jury by 
exam ining the dichotom y between its regressive and m aturing tendencies, and its 
potent ial to sustain dem ocracy.  
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